# c1: the comment section as a verification layer, and what happens when it is manipulated

Read 18 Nov 2026. "Read" = the page itself was fetched and read. "(summary)" = seen only in a search summary or a secondary write-up. Nothing here names a private person.

## Headline

1. No survey I found gives ">90%" (or any majority) for "I read the comments to judge whether a video is real or AI". The honest position: no direct, quotable share exists in what I could reach. The only hard number is that the Reuters Institute 2025 report names reading other users' comments as something younger people do more, with no percentage attached.
2. Experiments show comments do move belief, both ways: critical comments lower belief in fake posts, and misleading comments raise belief in false ones. In the best-controlled deepfake experiment (Kenya, n=7,000 (summary)) the comments under the video changed support for the politician.
3. Manipulating a comment section is documented, but the proof is mostly takedowns by platforms and reports by journalists. Both Congress- and BJP-linked networks were removed by Facebook in 2019. In 2024 an AI-made comment network aimed at Indian voters was removed. I found no audited, named study of paid comment brigades in Tamil Nadu.
4. Truth is slow: a median of four days from a US 2022 election narrative's first appearance to its first fact-check.

---

## 1. How many people check comments to judge real vs AI?

### 1a. Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2025 (global, about 48 countries; read)
URL: https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2025/dnr-executive-summary
- Asked where they would FIRST check a suspicious claim: news outlets they trust 38%, official sources 35%, fact-checkers 25%, search engines 33%, social media 14% (AI chatbots 9% appears only in secondary write-ups (summary)).
- Text: younger people are more likely to check social media "including by reading comments from other users to help them make up their minds", and to use AI chatbots. The report says this is a "flatter" pattern of trust.
- No percentage is given for comments on that page. No sample size per question on that page.
- SAYABLE as: "Oxford's Reuters Institute says younger people are more likely to read other users' comments to decide what is true. It gives no figure for how many." The only number you can attach is that social media in general is the first stop for 14% against 38% for trusted news brands, worldwide, 2025. Do NOT say "most people check the comments".

### 1b. Ofcom, UK, week before the July 2024 general election (YouGov survey; (summary))
URL (coverage): https://www.lbc.co.uk/tech/f5ed7084fc034956adae32f1bdb9f86d
- 45% feel they can confidently judge whether sources are truthful; only 30% feel they can confidently judge whether an image, audio or video is AI-generated. 71% had seen misleading content. 47% ignored it, 26% searched for a more authoritative source, 24% checked a trusted news site. Comments are not named in the summary.
- SAYABLE as: "In the UK only about three in ten say they can confidently tell whether a video is AI." Check the Ofcom original before using any other number.

### 1c. Other numbers that look close but are not about comments
- Verasight, 1,509 US adults, July-August 2025: 57% at least somewhat confident they can tell AI content (summary). URL: https://data.verasight.io/ai/can-americans-spot-ai-generated-content-six-in-ten-say-yes
- Which? May 2026: 70% failed to identify all the real/fake videos shown (summary). URL: https://www.which.co.uk/news/article/can-you-spot-a-deepfake-aOMLu0Y95TD8
- Pew (2017 science posts, 2018 news): searches returned only trust figures, nothing about reading comments (summary).
- India: surveys found (DEF 2018 rural WhatsApp, ~1,000 respondents; Factly 2018) are old and about WhatsApp forwards, none about comments (summary).
- Nothing in my searches matches ">90%". The nearest "90%" in this area is a different fact: more than 90% of submitted X Community Notes never get published (see 3d). Do not mix them.
- NPR (30 Nov 2025) and Connecticut Public advise "check the comments" as a tactic for spotting AI video. It is advice, not a measured share. URL: https://www.npr.org/2025/11/30/nx-s1-5610951/fake-ai-videos-slop-quiz (summary).

### 1d. What commenters actually do (observed behaviour, read)
- Yeung, Weld, Mink, Roesner (Univ. of Washington / Arizona State), arXiv 2606.22689, June 2026. 13,098 posts and 222,060 comments on r/RealOrAI and r/isthisAI, July 2023 to March 2026. Strategies named by commenters: physical details 44.5%, content plausibility 16.8%, intuition 12.7%, AI style 9.0%, triangulating info 5.3%. The paper does not test whether the crowd is right. URL: https://www.alphaxiv.org/abs/2606.22689.md
- Sora comments study, arXiv 2512.05519, Dec 2025: 254 comments on 41 videos; commenters judge realism from lighting, shadows, physics; one wrote "I'm convinced all of these comments are bots". Small, English-only, no percentages. URL: https://arxiv.org/html/2512.05519
- SAYABLE as: "There are whole communities where people crowd-judge whether a clip is AI, and the biggest clue they use is how things physically look, not who posted it. Nobody has measured how often those crowd verdicts are right."

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## 2. Do comments change belief?

### 2a. Colliander 2019, Computers in Human Behavior 97:202-215 (read the abstract at the publisher index)
URL: https://research.hhs.se/esploro/outputs/journalArticle/This-is-fake-news-Investigating-the/991001480509106056 (DOI 10.1016/j.chb.2019.03.032)
- Fake news post with critical comments from other users: lower attitude to the post, fewer positive comments, weaker intention to share, compared with supportive comments. A platform disclaimer was less effective than the critical comments. Sample size: not in abstract; one poster says 201 participants (summary).
- SAYABLE as: "In one experiment, other users' critical comments cut belief in a fake post more than the platform's own warning did."

### 2b. Anspach and Carlson 2020, Political Behavior 42:697-718 (summary)
URL: https://profiles.wustl.edu/en/publications/what-to-believe-social-media-commentary-and-belief-in-misinformat/
- People who saw a news preview with misinformative comments were more misinformed about the topic, repeating the wrong fact from the comments. Sample not confirmed.
- SAYABLE as: "People who read a wrong comment under a news link repeated the wrong fact afterwards."

### 2c. Stockel, Stockli, Lyons, Kroker, Reifler, "The Power of the Crowd", Cambridge UP, 2025 (read press page)
URL: https://news.exeter.ac.uk/?p=23507
- More than 10,000 people in Germany, the UK and Italy; fieldwork 2022-2023; 47 topics, false posts from fact-checkers. Accurate comments help people spot misinformation; misleading comments can undermine trust in correct information. People process comments superficially, as "quick warning signals".
- SAYABLE as: "A study of over 10,000 people in three countries found comments work as quick warning signals, and that works against the truth too: a misleading comment can lower trust in a correct post."

### 2d. Altay et al. 2025, HKS Misinformation Review (read)
URL: https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/the-small-effects-of-short-user-corrections-on-misinformation-in-brazil-india-and-the-united-kingdom
- Pre-registered, March 2021, Kantar panels, 1,000 people in each of Brazil, India and the UK. Nine real Facebook posts about COVID (six false). A short user correction (with or without a fact-check link) was added under four of the false posts.
- India, correction with link: accuracy rating down b = -0.16 (p = .016, -10.8%); sharing b = -0.17 (-11.6%). India, correction without link: -5.0% accuracy, not significant. UK: -1.2% to -8.2%, not significant. Authors: "short user corrections have small effects". Self-reported, participants could not click links.
- SAYABLE as: "In a 3,000-person test across India, Brazil and the UK, a short correcting comment moved belief only a little: roughly 5 to 11% lower belief in India, even less in the UK."
- Note: this cuts against the idea that a single "this is fake" comment settles it. It also gives some comfort: one comment is not mind control.

### 2e. Walther et al. 2010, Human Communication Research (summary)
URL: https://phys.org/news/2010-11-youtube-psas-comments-persuasive-videos.html
- College students rated anti-marijuana YouTube PSAs as more effective when attached comments were pro-PSA; effect strongest for those who identified with commenters. Lead author said comments moved attitudes more than the video variations did. Old, not about deepfakes, small student sample.
- SAYABLE as: "Old lab work found comments under a video can matter more than the video."

### 2f. Deepfake plus comments: Wack and Prochaska, Kenya, Social Media + Society 2026 (summary; the journal page returned 403)
Described as: "Making Sense of AI-Generated Disinformation: How Audience Interpretations Influence the Impact of Deepfakes in Kenya". Survey experiment, n = 7,000. A generated clip of presidential candidates discussing a fake corruption scheme with embedded comments of varying skepticism. Comments that did not note the synthetic origin reduced support for the politician; skeptical comments partly restored it. Respondents dismissed deepfakes about their own side more readily. DOI path 10.1177/20563051261462092. Two abstract pages agreed; I could not open the paper. Effect sizes unknown.
- SAYABLE as (hedged): "A 2026 experiment in Kenya with 7,000 people put comments under a fake corruption video. Comments that treated it as real cost the politician support, and sceptical comments gave some of it back." Say "as summarised", not "the paper proves".

### 2g. Hameleers / Clark and Lewandowsky: even a known fake leaves a mark (summary)
URL: https://www.pulse.bot/media/news/deepfake-videos-degrade-political-reputations-even-when-viewers-realize-they-are-fake-b9af626f-ffc9-4bbb-8999-abea2bd3e8e9/
- Reputational damage persisted after the fake label. Not read at source; use only as a pointer.

---

## 3. Is the comment layer manipulated?

### 3a. Meta + OpenAI, May-June 2024: an AI-driven comment campaign aimed at Indian voters (read BOOM report)
URL: https://boomlive.in/news/meta-openai-combat-manipulated-content-targeting-indian-elections-sikh-groups-25524
- OpenAI (3 June 2024) attributed a covert operation to STOIC, an Israeli political campaign firm, that used its models to generate content. Fake accounts commented on the operation's own posts "likely in an attempt to create the impression of audience engagement". In May it shifted to comments on India criticising the BJP and praising Congress. OpenAI said "minimal engagement". Meta removed 510 Facebook accounts, 11 pages, 1 group and 32 Instagram accounts.
- SAYABLE as: "In 2024 an Israeli firm used AI to write fake comments aimed at Indian voters during the election. It was caught within a day and drew little engagement. The point is how cheap it now is." (Do not say which side it favoured as a verdict on anyone; it criticised the ruling party.)

### 3b. Facebook, 1 April 2019: coordinated fake pages tied to both big parties (summary; Reuters blocked)
URL: https://scroll.in/article/918677/explainer-why-did-facebook-take-down-hundreds-of-bjp-and-congress-linked-pages (also https://www.dawn.com/news/1473455)
- Facebook removed 687 pages and accounts linked to individuals associated with an Indian National Congress IT cell, and 15 pages, groups and accounts linked to an IT firm, Silver Touch (pro-BJP), for "coordinated inauthentic behavior". Quartz analysis cited by Dawn: Congress-linked set about 206,000 followers, the 15 pro-BJP pages about 2.6 million. Congress said none of its official pages were taken down.
- SAYABLE as: "In 2019 Facebook removed hundreds of fake pages tied to people in the IT cells of both Congress and a BJP-linked firm. Both sides ran this machinery." Pages, not comments specifically.

### 3c. Oxford Internet Institute, 2020 global inventory (read the summary page)
URL: https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/industrialized-disinformation/
- 81 countries with organised social-media manipulation; about US$60 million spent hiring private firms since 2009; 48 instances of private companies running computational propaganda; 317,000+ accounts/pages removed by platforms, Jan 2019 to Dec 2020. The page does not mention India; India counts in the PDF (summary only; PDF 404) varied between outlets, so do not quote an India count.
- SAYABLE as: "Oxford counted organised manipulation in 81 countries in 2020, with private firms for hire."

### 3d. India, Tamil Nadu: reporting, not audit
- The Week, 21 April 2026 (read): says the DMK, AIADMK, NTK and TVK "have spent several crores on bots to tweak algorithms". The article's own narration, no named source, no documents; budgets "Rs 5-20 crore" for DMK and TVK from unnamed "war room strategists". URL: https://www.theweek.in/news/india/2026/04/21/from-reels-to-votes-the-evolving-role-of-social-media-influencers-in-tamil-nadu-politics.html
- SAYABLE as: "Indian press reports that Tamil Nadu parties pay for bots and influencers; the figures come from unnamed party strategists and are not audited." Do not name a party as guilty on this.
- DO NOT USE: The Wire's "Tek Fog" (Jan 2022; 18% of 46 lakh replies to 280 women journalists attributed to app-managed accounts). The Wire took the stories down in Oct 2022 pending review and the Editors Guild withdrew its references. Outcome of the review not found. https://www.thenewsminute.com/article/wire-retracts-meta-stories-tek-fog-investigation-be-reviewed-too-169165 (summary of the retraction).

### 3e. Community Notes: slow, and gameable
- Coverage of notes: DDIA study of 1.76 million notes, Jan 2021 to Mar 2025: "more than 90 percent never reach the public"; English publication rate fell 9.5% (2023) to 4.9% (early 2025); average time submission-to-publication fell from 100+ days (2022) to 14 days (2025). URL (read): https://fortune.com/2025/07/10/more-than-90-x-community-notes-are-never-published-stuck-limbo-study/ . A median "7 hours to visibility / mean 38.5 hours" attributed to DDIA is only in a wiki summary and I could not confirm it. Do not use it.
- Chuai et al., arXiv 2307.07960 (read abstract): no evidence the notes feature significantly reduced engagement with misleading tweets; may be "too slow" in the early viral stage. The 96.7%-of-reposts-before-note figure is secondary only; not confirmed.
- Gaming Consensus, ICML 2026 (read abstract): using production data, up to 10.7% of lower-quality notes could be pushed over the consensus threshold with fewer than 10 ratings; rating "Not Helpful" can sometimes raise a note's score; authors say mitigations are deployed. URL: https://icml.cc/virtual/2026/poster/64544
- Indicator, 14 Apr 2026 (read): five X accounts, two active almost only during the 2024 UK election, posted "No Note Needed" on 84 tweets by then-PM Sunak and Conservative-linked accounts, and downvoted 97% of corrective notes on those same tweets; many targeted notes lost helpful status. Operator unknown; inference, not causal proof. URL: https://indicator.media/p/inside-a-pro-conservative-influence-operation-on-community-notes
- SAYABLE as: "A small group can sometimes push crowd verdicts: researchers found a way for a few ratings to lift weak notes, and one group downvoted 97% of corrections on the posts it wanted to protect. X says it has patched the hole."

### 3f. Grok and "is this real" replies
- DFRLab, 24 June 2025 (read): about 130,000 posts (headline says 100,000+), 12-15 June 2025. For an AI-generated video of a destroyed airport sold as Tel Aviv's Ben Gurion, Grok flipped between confirming and denying, even within a minute; before a community note 31% of its replies confirmed damage. For an AI-made building-collapse video, Grok said it "appeared to be real" in multiple instances, citing CBS, Newsweek and CNN. URL: https://dfrlab.org/2025/06/24/grok-struggles-with-fact-checking-amid-israel-iran-war/
- Full Fact (2026) (summary): Grok said a Glasgow fire photo was AI "repeatedly" when it was real; also called a 2022 Saudi fire video footage of Tel Aviv. URL: https://fullfact.org/culture-and-society/grok-misidentifies-glasgow-fire-as-tel-aviv/
- BOOM / AFP (summary): in India-Pakistan tensions Grok called a video-game dogfight real footage of Operation Sindoor, and many users cited Grok as proof. URL: https://www.boomlive.in/amp/explainers/grok-x-misinformation-fake-news-fact-checking-verification-28680
- SAYABLE as: "The AI replies people now treat like a comment verdict have been wrong both ways: calling a fake real, and a real photo AI."

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## 4. Documented cases: real called fake, fake called real

Real called AI / fake:
- AFP-reported Netanyahu video, 2026 Iran war (read via Al-Monitor): a real video called AI because of an "extra" finger; digital forensics researchers said a trick of light; one related X post nearly five million views. A proof-of-life coffee-shop clip: one detection tool said "96.9 percent AI-generated", others the opposite. URL: https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2026/04/whats-real-anymore-ai-warps-truth-middle-east-war
- DFRLab, July 2024, Trump rally shooting (read): a local news report about Trump signs near the shooter's home was answered "Keep trying DEEPFAKE"; a leaked call was called "easily a deepfake" by an X user; Meta's fact-check on a doctored AP photo sometimes landed on the authentic photo (Meta spokesperson: "in some cases our systems incorrectly applied that fact check to the real photo"). URL: https://dfrlab.org/2024/08/23/how-ai-tools-fueled-online-conspiracy-theories-after-trump-assassination-attempt/
- AP, 4 Sept 2025 (read): Trump said footage of an object tossed from a White House window was "probably AI" after his press team had told reporters it was real; Venezuela's communications minister called a US strike video "almost cartoonish animation" (no verification reported). Hany Farid: once anything can be fake, "nothing has to be real". URL: https://www.news4jax.com/news/politics/2025/09/04/the-president-blamed-ai-and-embraced-doing-so-is-it-becoming-the-new-fake-news/

Fake called real:
- Burj Khalifa collapse AI video: over 10 million views before a Community Note, over 12 million by then (AFP via Al-Monitor, same URL as above). Same article: AFP found an official Iranian account's bloodied-backpack photo very likely AI, "yet few online seemed troubled". AFP: 500+ debunks since the war began; ISD: a network posting AI war content amassed over one billion views.
- Doctored AP photo, July 2024: 5,340 X mentions over 30 days, 1.94 million views (DFRLab, above).

Note: these show the verdict going wrong, not comments as the cause in a measured way. Do not claim "comments caused" any of them.

SAYABLE as: "Real footage has been called fake, and fake called real, by crowds, by detection tools and by chatbots, in the same wars and elections."

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## 5. Urge to settle quickly; truth is slow

### 5a. Need for cognitive closure (read abstract)
Kruglanski and Webster 1996, Psychological Review 103(2):263-283. URL: https://terpconnect.umd.edu/~hannahk/NFC-KW96.html
- "The urgency tendency represents an individual's inclination to attain closure as soon as possible"; "the permanence tendency represents an individual's inclination to maintain it for as long as possible". Evidence listed across impression formation, stereotyping, attribution, persuasion, group decision making.
- SAYABLE as: "Psychologists describe a pull to get an answer fast and then keep it. A confident-sounding comment hands you a fast answer." The second half is my link, not the paper's claim. Say "this fits".

### 5b. Speed of correction
- Wack, Duskin, Hodel, arXiv 2412.13280 (read abstract): US 2022 midterms on X; median fact-check appeared "a full four days" after a narrative first emerged; fewer than half of prominent election-misinformation narratives were fact-checked; fact-checks were under 1.2% of the conversation. URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2412.13280
- Hoaxy (Shao et al. 2016) fact-checks lag misinformation by about 10 to 20 hours; median false rumour took over 14 hours to resolve against about 2 hours for true (summary). URL: https://inverse.com/article/13378-government-surveillance-program-finds-it-takes-13-hours-to-fact-check-twitter
- SAYABLE as: "On X in 2022 the typical fact-check came four days after the claim began, and fewer than half of the big election stories got one."
- DDIA: 14 days average for a note to publish in 2025 (read via Fortune), see 3e.

### 5c. Not found at source
- Vosoughi, Roy, Aral 2018 (false news 70% more likely to be retweeted; truth six times slower to reach 1,500 people): the Science page returned 403, so I cannot quote it as read. Mark (summary from memory/secondary); verify before use.
- Lally habit data: not looked up.

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## What I could NOT find

1. Any survey that gives a share of people who read comments to decide if a video is AI or real, in the US, India or globally. No ">90%". Highest honest comment-linked statement is only the Reuters 2025 sentence with no number.
2. The Reuters Institute 2025 chart numbers for "read other users' comments" (the chart is an image) and the 2026 verification figures at source (only secondary 44%/42% figures, unconfirmed).
3. A Pew item on reading comments to judge accuracy.
4. The full text or effect sizes of the Kenya deepfake-plus-comments study (Wack and Prochaska 2026); only abstract-level summaries.
5. An experiment testing "this is AI" comments specifically lowering belief in a REAL video (the liar's-dividend-by-comments case). Closest: Kenya (summary) and Colliander (fake news, not AI).
6. An audited or named study of paid comment brigades in Tamil Nadu, and any Meta or OpenAI report naming a Tamil Nadu party. Only press reports with unnamed sources.
7. A confirmed median time-to-note for Community Notes (the 7 h / 38.5 h figures are unconfirmed; the 96.7% figure is unconfirmed).
8. The OII 2020 PDF India chapter (404); India counts differ across outlets.
9. Vosoughi 2018 at source; Lally habit data; Hameleers study at source.
10. A study of how often crowd "is this AI" verdicts (Reddit/YouTube) are correct.
